agreement with a continuance in time",5 the continuing infringement concept was also intended, by focusing on bad conduct as much as on the element of consensus, to capture and translate to an EC context the "offensiveness" implicit in the criminal conspiracy. To all intents and purposes a conspiracy to fix prices, it has been dubbed the "single complex and continuous infringement" ("SCCI" for short).6 Although the Commission shies away from the term, it could equally be called the "cartel offence".7
This common law import into Community law was endorsed with enthusiasm by the Community judiciary.8 It has provided the model for every Commission decision in a cartel case over the past twenty years.9 While along with the dawn raid and later the institution of leniency, it has given the Commission the weapons to tackle a hundred or more suspected hard core cartels, there was no special magic in the concept: it aimed to connect more efficiently and in a practical fashion the legal prohibition of Article 81 with the reality of cartel conduct. It was not intended to provide a short cut to proof or a substitute for focused legal analysis. And it certainly was not intended as a device to render illegal conduct that was not already an infringement of Article 81 or to provide some plausibility for avoiding the application of the rules on limitation.
After recalling the origins of the "continuing infringement" concept in the common law of conspiracy, the present article addresses one of the most important areas in EC practice where its application has been decisive and controversial: whether the collusive arrangements constitute one infringement or a number of separate ones. The controversy mirrors the "single versus multiple conspiracies" debate in United States case law. In an extension of the concept and the case law, complex offending conduct that appears to involve several separate cartels -whether successive or simultaneous-is bundled in the decision into a "single infringement". At the other extreme, the Commission has in some cases found discrete "national" cartels, despite itself highlighting a close interrelation arguing at first sight in favour of a single over-arching 5 See US v Kissel 218 US 601 (1910) : "But when the plot contemplates bringing to pass a continuous result that will not continue without the continuous co-operation of the conspirators to keep it up, and there is such continuous co-operation, it is a perversion of natural thought and of natural language to call such continuous co-operation a cinematographic series of distinct conspiracies, rather than to call it a single one." 6 The omnibus phrase now appears as a formulaic recitation in most Commission cartel decisions. At least up to Pre-Insulated Pipes, the decision referred to a "complex infringement" or a "single continuous infringement". In Copper Plumbing Tubes, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/38069/en.pdf accessed on 6 May 2009, the Commission at recital 459 for two of the participants (Wieland and KME) characterised the cartel as a "single, complex and multiform infringement", a term which it explained as intended to designate an infringement consisting of "separate but […] interconnected manifestations". Since in addition there were two different products and three separate fora, for collusion, the formulation potentially begs the question that lies at the heart of the discussion.
scheme. This is no scholastic quiddity: the implications in terms of substantive and procedural law, due process and the operation of the leniency notice of "getting it wrong" can be far reaching. The consistent application of principle is difficult to discern in the decisions, and if the Court of First Instance's ad hoc approach to review usually militates against the articulation of a rule of general application, its judgment in BASF and UCB v Commission 10 represents the "single best attempt of the EC Courts to sort out the concept."11 Drawing on the lessons provided by U. S. Sherman Act experience, which provided the inspiration and conceptual model for the single continuous infringement,12 this article suggests a uniform approach to provide a fair and workable solution to the problem.
NECCESSITY IS THE MOTHER OF INVENTION
The Commission's reputation in recent years as a scourge of price fixers has been won in unlikely circumstances: it is not a law enforcement agency; it has jurisdiction only over companies and not individuals, and the legal instruments at its disposal are by no means focused on turpitude.13 The magnitude of the fines now routinely imposed tends to obscure the fact that Article 85 EEC (as it originally was) was not specifically intended as a repressive instrument to catch secret cartels or punish morally bad behaviour, having instead an economic rationale: bringing under the ambit of administrative surveillance the broadest range of commercial arrangements so that the Commission could evaluate their compatibility with the Rome Treaty's goals of breaking down barriers to trade.14 Since for many years the Commission viewed its exclusive power to grant exemptions as its most potent tool for developing competition policy, it meant that Article 81 (1) was interpreted broadly to catch restrictions on competition a long way from a hard core cartel.15
To be sure, Article 81's prohibition of "all agreements between undertakings…and concerted practices" that may affect trade between member states and which have the object or effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition in the common market has a distinct echo of the Sherman Act. It may lack the alliterative ring of Section One's condemnation of "every contract, combination…or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states" but at first sight, it seems to provide the Commission with a well-focused legal instrument to punish secret cartels. The similarity is deceptive. The two provisions have fundamentally different positions in the spectrum of normative responses to cartel organization.16 While Section One is a federal statute enforced criminally and civilly by the courts as the law of the land, Article 81 was originally conceived as part of a system of administrative control operated by the Commission which had no criminal law powers and no jurisdiction over individuals. Though its threshold of application was low, the prohibition is not an absolute one. As its structure suggests, Article 81, with its equal emphasis on the exemption that used to be the Commission's exclusive domain, has to be viewed holistically. Long after the 10 12 The genesis is described in Joshua and Jordan, supra n 4. 13 Joshua and Jordan, supra n 4, 648-650.
14 For a discussion of the history, see D Goyder, EC Competition Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 3 rd edn, 1998) chs 3,4.
15 I Forrester and C Norall, "The Laicisation of Community law, Self-help and the Rule of Reason" (1984) 21 Common Market Law Review 11. 16 Joshua and Jordan, supra n 4, 649. for a concise comparison of EU competition law and US antitrust law, see S P Reynolds, "International Antitrust Compliance for a Company with Multilateral Observations" (1996) 8 International Quarterly 76.
holistically. Long after the emergence of what looks like a cartel offence, a process in which it played a not unimportant role, the Court of First Instance still went out of its way to insist that there are no per se violations of Article 81.17 Even without proceeding to Article 81 (3), there is nothing in the bare text of Article 81 that encapsulates the furtive and conspiratorial mindset of the participants or the constant evolution of its manifestations over its lifetime that make a hardcore cartel so pernicious: what the author and Professor Harding have identified as the "spiral of delinquency".18 Indeed, as one of the leading text books observes, "the essential feature of Article 81 is that its application in any given case depends on the economic aims or effects of transactions entered into between undertakings."19
If secreted somewhere in the interstices of Article 81 there is the essence of a cartel offence, delineating its amorphous form defies easy definition, and the task has been further complicated by the historical legacy. Under the prevailing analysis of the sixties and seventies, the category of "agreement" was reserved for formal commercial contracts.20 On that view, an un-notified cartel could only be caught as a concerted practice, but whatever evidence of collusion, critics still insisted on explaining away parallel pricing under oligopoly theory.21 Practitioners with experience only of today's unrelentingly cartel-hostile climate would be bemused by the two flagship cases of the sixties, Quinine22 and. Dyestuffs23 There is no sense of awareness in the decisions, the judgments or any of the voluminous commentary of the time,24 of any turpitude; legal debate centred on the boundaries between collusion and pure coincidence, the evidence was sparse and the fines imposed would have pleased a parking offender.25 Cartel analysis, such as it was, was preoccupied with finding the line between conscious parallelism (permitted) and concerted practice 20 The argument was still being made by the defence lawyers of the chemical producers in Polypropylene in the early 1990s. 21 A number of critics read the Dyestuffs judgment (wrongly) as basing a finding of collusion on the mere fact of simultaneous price announcements. In fact the Court had been careful to state that on its own parallel pricing was by itself insufficient evidence of collusion. For a broadside against the Court of Justice, see F A Mann, "The Dyestuffs Case in the Court of Justice of the European Communities" (1973) 24 One of the most severe academic critics of the judgment of the Court in Dyestuffs was the late Professor Rene Joliet, subsequently Juge Rapporteur in the Woodpulp case: R Joliet, "La notion de pratique concertée et l'arrêt ICI dans une perspective comparative" (1974) 15 Cahiers de Droit Européen 251. For an account of the strange imbroglio and devastating demolition of the Commission in that case, see Harding and Joshua, supra n 7, 155-159. 25 The fines in Quinine ranged from 10,000 to 210,000 units of account. In Dyestuffs most of the fines were in the region of 50,000 u.a, leading Advocate General Mayras to describe them as "moderate." By today's standards that description would apply to a fine a hundred even a thousand times that order. practice (unlawful) in cases where there were few plus factors.26
CAPTURING THE CONSPIRACY
The pervasiveness, high level involvement and sophisticated organisation of the petrochemical cartels -now seen as the "hallmark" of the hardcore cartel -was as complete a surprise to the officials handling the case as the dawn raids were to the target companies.27 To capture the whole entrenched scheme of conspiratorial behaviour that was uncovered in the petrochemicals industry, and later in other sectors,28 the concept of the single continuous infringement was developed and made its first appearance in the Polypropylene decision in 1986. In its essence, it treats the continuum of collective activity of a cartel as an agreement in terms of Article 81: "A complex cartel may properly be viewed as a single continuing infringement for the time frame in which it existed. The agreement may well be varied from time to time, or its mechanisms adapted or strengthened to take account of new developments. The validity of this assessment is not affected by the possibility that one or more elements of a series of actions or of a continuous course of conduct could individually and in themselves constitute a violation of article 81 (1) of the Treaty."29
The inspiration for the shift was provided by the notion of "agreement" peculiar to the common law of conspiracy and adopted in the Sherman Act. Criminal conspiracy is basically an agreement to commit an unlawful act, usually a criminal offence.30 But though "agreement is the primary element of conspiracy",31 it is a special type of agreement. Indeed, courts have sometimes used language that comes close to dispensing with the necessity to infer a definite agreement at all.32 Yet if the law is in reality punishing conduct of which it disapproves, it still has to make the link to an agreement of some kind, an exercise which calls for a certain judicial agility.33 Agreement shades into execution.34 First year students know that at 30 In the normal criminal law context conspiracy is thus an inchoate offence. Section One Sherman Act was an example of the type of statutory conspiracy where neither the underlying end nor the means adopted were in themselves unlawful. Rather the enacting statute creates the "initial" illegality. 31 In Pre-Insulated Pipes, supra n 42, there was a short hiatus of six months during which as a result of a "power struggle" inside the cartel the normal arrangements and relationships were suspended but bilateral and trilateral contacts continued. The Commission found that on the facts the cartel had continued since there was "a continuing objective of restricting competition" but did not impose fines for the 6 month period when the arrangements were "effectively in abeyance". ABB, the ringleader, did not context that the cartel had continued throughout that period. It should be noted that the Guidelines in force at the time gave the Commission some discretion in calculating duration: see recital 170. According to Faull and Nikpay, "[t]he fact that there are certain gaps in the sequence of events established by the Commission does not mean that the infringement cannot be regarded as uninterrupted." A temporary upturn in the market removing the need for close collusion does not mean to say that the collusion has actually stopped. being avoided by the parties since secrecy is fundamental for a successful cartel.49 The approach recognised that cartels worked on tacit, even inchoate, understandings as well as express assurances. It also necessarily implied that different players could play different roles but still be party to the same infringement.50 The time element is however probably the single most critical aspect in which the "conspiracy agreement" captured the essence of cartel misbehaviour. Cartels, like any other complicated conspiracy, are "not born full-grown"51 but develop organically as the members conceive ever more sophisticated ways to achieve their objectives while reducing the risk of detection.52 Recognition of the time dimension served several useful purposes. By emphasising the continuing nature of the venture, it consigned to the dustbin the debate as to whether a cartel was one or a series of infringements.53 It also rendered obsolete any inquiry as to whether this or that manifestation of the cartel was an "agreement" or a "concerted practice": the distinction, if there ever was one, simply did not matter any more.54 The Commission did not have to try any longer to apply legal definitions to the conduct that could be observed in the market, in specie simultaneous price increases ("outcome" in current jargon) in ignorance with few indications of whether it was driven by competition or collusion. Depending on which way or when you looked at it, the cartel conduct could present the characteristics more of one form of illicit conduct than the other or 49 In organized crime conspiracies, "(t)he formalities of an agreement are not necessary and are usually lacking since the hallmark of a successful conspiracy is secrecy": see US v Varelli 407 F 2d 735 (7 th Cir. 1969). Price fixing cartels require a lot more paperwork. In many hardcore cartels, there is an actual underlying and documented agreement, sometimes in the form of basic rules of considerable sophistication to which actual formal consent is given, while the continuing operation over many years may also be recorded and memorialised in such detail that one can speak almost of agreed terms. The discovery by the Commission of the original cartel "blueprint" followed by evidence of regular meetings of the kind envisaged therein (as in PVC) has in some cases compensated for the unexplained absence of internal price instructions showing implementation of concerted industry price initiatives. In Pre-insulated Pipes the drafter disposed en passant of the misconception that the terms of the bargain struck by the parties is an "agreement" and its working out a "concerted practice." other or of both at the same time.55 But there was no need to invoke such indirect analytical tools or make such distinctions when the Commission was as good as sitting in on the cartel meetings -hence, the "single" and the "complex" aspects in the descriptive "SCCI" title of the cartel offence. Although the Polypropylene decision still paid lip service to the need to look at both forms of prohibited conduct, by Pre-Insulated Pipes the Commission was treating the whole cartel simply as an agreement, even during the periodic outbreaks of conflict inside the cartel. 56 The 'cheating' phenomenon which the participants had argued showed their lack of 'commitment' (hence no "agreement" or "concerted practice") was simply part of the normal life of a cartel, and would in any case be corrected by its mechanisms.57 And echoing the familiar injunction of common law judges that a conspiracy must be treated as a whole and not broken up into its component parts,58 the Community courts took a holistic view of cartel conduct.59 The whole process, the negotiations leading up to a consensus, the jockeying for position, periodic fits of sulks, indeed the whole unedifying game of cartel diplomacy, was viewed as an integrated whole.60 Treating a cartel in this way also implied that membership could change, the modus operandi could evolve and the scope extended without each development being a new infringement.61
Recognition of the conspiratorial -and durable -nature of cartels has also mandated a fresh approach to issues of proof by the Commission and more importantly the courts. It hardly needs stating that proof may often be circumstantial, though of course this does not mean it can be equivocal.62 Requiring the Commission to prove each and every manifestation of the cartel and every action taken to advance its purposes by every participant would however fail to take account of the way cartels operate. Given the secrecy cartels need in order to thrive, and their composite nature, it should suffice to (a) demonstrate the essential features, objectives and operation of the cartel as an ongoing venture by clear and convincing evidence; (b) connect, by means of the appropriate evidence, each participant to the common scheme for the duration of their alleged involvement, and in practice (c), show the role played by each.63 Accusations 55 Case T-7/89 Hercules v Commission [1991] ECR II-1711, para 256. 56 Polypropylene, supra n 41, recital 87. (Some episodes identified as a "concerted practice"). 57 Besides the use of reporting mechanisms to monitor compliance with quotas, a standard feature of many hardcore cartels is the use of compensation schemes and penalties to regularise discrepancies: see PreInsulated Pipes, supra n 42, recital 65; Citric Acid [2002] OJ L 239/18. 58 US v Patten, 226 US 525, 544 (1913): "It hardly needs statement that the character and effect of a company is (sic) not to be determined by dismembering it and viewing its separate parts but only by looking at it as a whole". 59 See e.g. Enichem Anic v Commission, supra n 8, paras 203-204. The ECJ was already applying this common-sense approach in Dyestuffs: "… the question whether there was concerted action in this case can only be correctly determined if the evidence upon which the contested decision is based is considered, not in isolation, but as a whole." Dyestuffs, supra n 23, para 68. 60 Pre-Insulated Pipes, supra n 42, recitals 137-138. that the approach in itself implies guilt by association are wildly misplaced and have been dismissed by the Court of Justice.64 While the venture is collective, guilt remains individual. Individual participants, especially at the margins, are not to be drawn into the net simply by reason of some or any contact with one of the main players: they have to participate intentionally and knowingly in the unlawful scheme. In a number of the early cases, fringe players who did not themselves participate in plenary meetings but were in contact with one of the core members after each cartel meeting (and even expressed "support") were given the benefit of the doubt.65 Community jurisprudence clearly does not subscribe to the evidential theory of some US courts that once the existence of the conspiracy is proved, "only slight evidence" is needed to connect the individuals to it.66 In line with the tendency in the US to de-emphasise that formulation,67 they have to adhere knowingly to the common enterprise.68 Given the nature of conspiracy, establishing the participation in the common scheme of individual parties does not however require proving their actual or imputed knowledge of every single detail, so long as they were clearly aware of the "general contours" at the time of their adherence.69
OUT OF MANY, ONE?
In a series of judgments the EC Courts gave their imprimatur to the concept developed in the petrochemicals and other decisions.70 In order to establish that a complex of offending conduct constituted a single continuing infringement, the Commission has to show (a) the existence of a common plan underlying the actions of the participants (b) a contribution by each of them to that common plan.71 In these circumstances, each undertaking is jointly responsible not only for its own individual conduct, but also for that of the other members pursuant to the common plan, if it knew or should have known how the land lay. 67 It has been explained by the Ninth Circuit that the rule means that the defendant may be convicted if the jury finds beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was a party to the conspiracy even if he played a minor role or was only tangentially involved. The evidence must establish "beyond a reasonable doubt a knowing connection of the defendant with the conspiracy, even though the connection be slight": see e.g. US v Meyers 847 F2d 1408, 1413 (9 th Cir, 1988). "Slight" qualifies "connection" not "evidence". However the Supreme Court has warned that it is precisely in cases where the conspiracy is broadened to include minor players that the possibilities of injustice to a particular defendant become greater and greater: 72 Anic Partecipazioni, supra n 8.
"
[A]n undertaking that had taken part in such an infringement through conduct of its own which formed an agreement or concerted practice having an anti-competitive object for the purposes of Article 85(1) of the Treaty and which was intended to help bring about the infringement as a whole was also responsible, throughout the entire period of its participation in that infringement, for conduct put into effect by other undertakings in the context of the same infringement. That is the case where it is established that the undertaking in question was aware of the offending conduct of the other participants or that it could reasonably have foreseen it and that it was prepared to take the risk."73
But although the Commission invariably cites this passage in decisions, it does not dispose of the question, were there single or multiple infringements? The "continuing infringement" was conceived as an instrument for treating conduct that was clearly all part of the same cartel as a single scheme. This is clear from the formulation used in Lysine74:
"This series of anti-competitive agreements was concluded in the context of a single common plan to regulate prices and supply on the lysine market. The undertakings concerned participated in an overall framework which manifested itself in agreements with the object of restricting competition between the participating undertakings on the lysine market. The Commission considers therefore that it is artificial to subdivide the individual actions into separate infringements as it is clear that the actions were undertaken in the context of an overall common plan pursuing the same anti-competitive purpose." 75
Commission officials closely connected with the administration of the current enforcement programme put it like this:
"As is clear from its description, a 'single and continuous infringement' is both a 'single' infringement in that the facts and circumstances involved are interwoven, and a 'continuous' one, in that the behaviour can be seen as belonging to an (uninterrupted or at least interrelated) string of occurrences."76
If its underlying logic is robust enough to point at least to a general approach to the separate issue of whether a given complex of conduct is one or several violations, the single infringement analysis did not on its own provide an answer. In pre-leniency days, the Commission went on the evidence created by the participants themselves in tempore non suspecto without the assistance of oral narrative and commentary helpfully provided by the lawyers acting for leniency applicants. If the issue of single or multiple cartels came up, the hard documentation seized in the dawn raids usually provided the answer. Where the cartel involves one product and the evidence shows the existence of a common plan, defence attempts to depict each separate episode of the cartel as separate infringements are a forlorn hope.77 Even where there are several distinct products, this by no means automatically means different infringements: the functioning and structure of the cartel itself may provide the best indication of its scope. May 2009, at points 246-261 where the CFI rejected the argument that the Commission had erred in law by finding that the original common purpose in 1992 could be a basis for the illegality of subsequent manifestations of the cartel. BPB was basically making the circular argument that continuity of purpose had to be assessed by splitting the cartel into its component parts, an approach that runs counter to the basic tenet that cartel conduct has to be assessed as a whole and in their overall context. resolved the question themselves by providing for several products in one written agreement. In Peroxygen Products 78 the producers concluded the formal, though secret, "France", "Germany" and "Benelux" agreements each covering both hydrogen peroxide and sodium perborate. It is not decisive either that "markets are national" in the jargon of accepted merger analysis; one cartel can cover the whole EU /EEA or even the whole world.79 And of course as a cartel grows in strength, markets are developed, barriers to trade come down and mutual "trust" is enhanced, its members may well extend its geographic scope, as in the 1998 Pre-Insulated Pipes decision. 80
If earlier cases presented few problems on this score, as the Commission's case docket has grown, driven largely by the institution of leniency, the issues have become less clear-cut and the decisions less consistent.
SINGLE OR MANIFOLD INFRINGEMENTS: THE CONTROVERSY
The "single or manifold infringement(s)" question has been decisive and controversial in various contexts in EU enforcement, including when:
(a) The "continuous" conduct arguably comprises successive and discrete cartels, which the Commission combines to increase duration and thus the fine or even to avoid the first fact set being time-barred;81 b) Simultaneous collusive arrangements in different products, not all of which are made by all the players, are treated by the Commission as one cartel, making undertakings jointly liable for price-fixing in products they do not make, with consequent exposure as co-conspirators to civil damages;82 (c) A "one-product" cartel covers the whole or a large part of the EU/EEA but operates sub-parts in some member states and one (or more) of the smaller producers that participates directly in only one national subset has been held liable for the overall infringement; 83 does not produce all three PMMA-products like the other participants of the anti-competitive arrangements does not change the nature and the object of the infringement which was to distort the normal movement of prices with regard to the three PMMA-products.
[I]t is clear that all participants in the anticompetitive arrangements adhered and contributed, to the extent they could (i.e. to the extent they were active in one or more of the products concerned by the arrangements) to the common anti-competitive plan."
83 See the position of Sigma in Pre-Insulated Pipes (the CFI annulled the finding of participation in the overall infringement).
(d) Arguably unconnected cartel arrangements in the EU and overseas are conflated into an alleged single "global cartel", treatment which blurs both jurisdictional lines and the precise definition of the substantive infringement of Article 81;84 (e) The Commission rolls up national "trade association" cartels, which may have started at different times, into a grand overarching conspiracy, thus potentially maximising the fine;85 and (f) In the reverse play of the last scenario, the same big players operate identical collusive arrangements in several "national" markets and the Commission (while fining the top group parents) treats the arrangements as separate local cartels rather than as one overall scheme, complicating still further the already unpredictable operation under Modernisation of leniency at both member state and EU level. The list is by no means exhaustive and scenarios may well overlap.
In theory, treating related behaviour as one single infringement instead of separate violations of Article 81 could sometimes favour the addressees of the proceedings since the total fine is capped at ten per cent of turnover.86 Had separate infringements been found on the same facts, it would be possible to go up to 10 per cent for each infringement. This is not so much a threat as it is seems. In reality, the calculation of fines by reference to the turnover in each product in the 2006 Fining Guidelines removes sting from the risk of dual imposition in concurrent behaviour.87 On the other hand, running consecutive arguably unconnected episodes together can have an exponential effect on the fine. 88 In most cases (see (a) to (e) above), treating episodes as one infringement increases the fine. In a tight call, the "one infringement" approach usually works to the undertakings' disadvantage, whether in terms of penalty or follow-on exposure to civil liability.
Although in some cases it has barely addressed the issue, when it has sought to justify its choice in the decision, the Commission has invoked various "objective elements": whether there was a common objective; whether the arrangements covered different products or services; whether the behaviour was similar in different geographic areas; and points of commonality in terms of cartel membership, modus operandi, personnel and nature of meetings.89 According to received wisdom, the elements are to be considered 84 See BASF and UCB v Commission, supra n 10, where the CFI overturned the Commission's decision that a global Choline Chloride "home market" cartel between the North American and European producers had morphed into an arrangement between the European producers after the first global arrangement had broken down. See also the Commission Decision in Gas Insulated Switchgear [2008] OJ C5/7 where similar issues are raised. The Japanese producers contended that they were only involved in a worldwide cartel which was separate from the European agreement. 85 Under the Fine Guidelines, the appropriate percentage of sales of each participant in the last full year of the cartel's operation is multiplied by the number of years' duration. If the national cartels are treated as one infringement, the "duration" is calculated from the start of the first manifestation. In that case, the CFI concluded that considered together, no one factor is decisive, and the weight accorded to each varies from case to case.90 That sounds reasonable enough, but EC officials seem to take the view that provided the Commission rehearses the various considerations, it has a "margin of discretion". While some decisions do discuss the question at considerable length, articulating a general conception, "some indwelling and creative principle", seems to have eluded the Commission. Decisions usually point to two features, a broadly defined "common goal" of fixing prices and various similarities in the schemes, but rarely does the Commission explain how the components are interlinked or what degree of knowledge is required. No doubt the Commission often reaches the "right" solution intuitively. The danger is that if the exercise becomes a mere recitation, it fuels accusations that the result is "political". And it does not help that to the extent the Commission has developed and articulated any principled test, its application on the ground is not entirely consistent.
Similar fact sets have given rise to decisions on both sides of the line.
Of course, cases with superficially similar or overlapping facts can fall on either side of the line and the decision is nevertheless obviously the right one.
The finding in Lombard Club 91 that the one and the same cartel covered the whole range of banking product services in Austria seems intuitively correct since the eponymous Club of top executives acted as the overall decision making body and an umbrella for the lower level specialist committees. And few would condemn the Commission's finding in Vitamins 92 of twelve separate cartels, one per product, with separate fines, although the two main players, BASF and Roche both made virtually the full range, the modus operandi of the arrangements for each of the vitamins was very similar and price increases for all vitamins were usually announced on the same occasion. Whatever the commonalities, there was no overall coordinating body, and the Commission may have baulked at the implications of making the less prominent producers liable, along with the two largest players, as co-conspirators in arrangements in products they did not make. And where, as in Citric Acid 93 and Sodium Gluconate, 94 one company happens to take part in two entirely separate cartels for two different products, the Commission can hardly be criticised for rejecting summarily claims that it "artificially" unravelled what was supposedly one cartel in order to fine the company twice. All these decisions were upheld by the CFI and few reasonable observers would challenge the outcome.
the Commission had based its choice on "objective factors" but did not attempt to articulate any test or guidelines. There was a potentially much more problematic outcome in Methacrylates 95 which is currently before the CFI for review: there one single infringement was found covering the three PMMA products, (moulding, solid sheet and bathroom) despite one minor producer making only solid sheet. The Commission found there were "sufficient links" to demonstrate adherence of all to a single common scheme: a core group of the same undertakings, a common chemical basis, spill-over in pricing, "occasional" common meetings and similar methods. One cartel can of course cover separate products, but it remains to be seen how the CFI will view the characterisation of the arrangements in the decision as an integrated whole in light of the Commission's having to drop after the oral hearing for lack of evidence the original allegation as against all addressees that the cartel had also included the upstream base product MMA.96
In Hydrogen Peroxide and Perborate, 97 once again not all the undertakings fined for the "single infringement" produced both products. The Commission finding that a common scheme encompassed both hydrogen peroxide and sodium perborate seems plausible enough however, since a considerable part of hydrogen peroxide production is consumed downstream as a raw material for perborate: a change in the price or quantitire sproduced in one product would have a bearing on the downstream product and vice versa. The Commission may have come closer than in other cases to articulating a principled test in observing that "the effects of the agreements regarding HP were intertwined with the arrangements regarding PBS." But troublesome issues remain since the collusion on PBS began later and ceased earlier than in peroxide, thus tending to undermine the interdependency of the arrangements. 98
To be sure, the horizons of cartel planners and participants are not circumscribed by "relevant market" analysis.99 The Commission observed correctly in Industrial Bags that by concluding anticompetitive agreements, undertakings determine de facto the parameters within which they compete with one another.100 There is no need for the Commission to resort to proxy methods for determining whether and what competition has been affected. But even if cartels know no frontiers, the geographic area or areas covered can give rise to problems. Is there one overall master conspiracy with sub-schemes, or multiple unrelated conspiracies? Where there are separate national cartels, but the same players are present in each, does it make any difference to find one overall cartel as opposed to several? And even if there is a broad scheme, what is the right way to treat a minor player that participates in only one "national" subset?
The question came up in Sigma's appeal in Pre-Insulated Pipes.101 The fact that Sigma had only been to meetings of the Italian contact group was recognised in the decision and rewarded in the form of a two-thirds 95 Methacrylates, supra n 82. 96 Methacrylates, supra n 82, para 27. thirds reduction in its otherwise appropriate fine, but the CFI read the decision as holding it was a member of the overall cartel 102 and overturned that finding on the ground the Commission had not proved that the applicant knew or ought to have known that by participating in the arrangements on the Italian market, it was also joining the wider European cartel. As the CFI remarked "The mere fact that there is identity of object between an agreement in which an undertaking participated and a global cartel does not suffice to render that undertaking responsible for the global cartel." To be sure, the Commission did not prove that it knew it was part of the wider scheme. Sigma may have been lucky: in similar circumstances, a US court would have asked what prejudice there had been to its substantial rights.103 Of course the issue may have more significance in today's climate of greater exposure to civil damages than was the case ten years ago, but the judgment does show that even where there was clearly one overall illegal venture, in the case of a minor player present in just one of its sub-schemes, the Commission "over charges" at its peril.
Pre-Insulated Pipes 104 was a case where on the evidence there was one overall European cartel operated by the "core" with a couple of minor players each active in just one national sub-part. In Industrial Bags 105 however it is not so obvious there was one over-arching scheme: the arrangements were operated largely through regional subgroups for France, Germany, Benelux and confusingly perhaps, Belgium and the Netherlands as well, plus at least one functional subgroup, forming more of a loose confederacy than a federation. The diffuse organisation and membership variations notwithstanding, the Commission found that a common "general strategy" of distorting the normal development of prices in plastic industrial bags was enough to draw them together in one collusive scheme.106 And while in one still pending case, "trade association" cartels in various member states are being treated as a single overall infringement, the Commission in Lifts and Escalators 107 determined without discussion that the arrangements between the four big players were "four separate but related single and continuous infringements of Article 81 in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands".108 There are a number of curious features to the case. The decision lists a whole series of factors which have been cited in other decisions as commonalities pointing to a single scheme.109 Only one of the producers disputed that there were separate national infringements.110 that there were separate national infringements.110 The fragmentation into discrete infringements generated a confusing leniency hodgepodge: although the investigation did not start as a result of an immunity application, different manufacturers coming in with fresh revelations after the ex officio dawn raids obtained full immunity in different "new" national markets.111 The difference in outcome between finding several infringements as opposed to one might have been even more dramatic had the case started not with a complaint but an 8 (a) immunity application.112 And even on the scenario that did occur, the complications of the competing immunity applications which have apparently been made to national authorities scarcely bear thinking about.113
So far, in view of the long lead times, few "difficult" cases have come up on appeal. In most cases, the CFI has supported the Commission's finding. Usually (but not always) the Commission has found one overall scheme and the applicants argue there were separate infringements.114 In JFE Engineering115 the CFI made short work of the argument of the Japanese producers that the "home market agreement" was in fact two cartels, one in Japan, the other in Europe (to which they did not belong), finding in a few terse paragraphs that the agreement to which all producers subscribed was an "integrated set of rules" that it would be artificial to decorticate.116 If the judgment gives little general guidance, it is hard on the facts to disagree with the Court that any other finding by the Commission would have been inappropriate.
The CFI took a very different view in another case where there were also both "global" price stabilisation arrangements and a European carve-up. In BASF v Commission 117 in December 2007, the Commission was called to order by the judges for what the applicants claimed was a colourable attempt to circumvent 110 Lifts and Escalators, supra n 107, para 555. (Thyssen Krupp). 111 The original inspections took place simultaneously in Belgium and Germany. Kone obtained full immunity for Belgium and Luxembourg and received a fine reduction of 50% for Germany. Otis was given full immunity for the Netherlands, reductions of 40% for Belgium and Luxembourg, and 25% for Germany. Thyssen Krupp was awarded discounts of 25% and 40% for Belgium and the Netherlands respectively.
112 If the conduct has been viewed as a single infringement, a company coming under Poitn 8(a) of the Leniency Notice might have received full immunity for the whole cartel even of it did not disclose its full geographic scope. 113 Under the system of "parallel competences" created by Regulation 1/2003, the national competition authorities (NACs) of the Member States are empowered to bring enforcement proceedings under Article 81 as well as under national law. Each authority has competence to decide whether or not to bring proceedings and each has its own leniency programme.
There is no harmonised EU-wide system of leniency and an application to one authority does not count as an application to any other or to the Commission. Nor does an application to the Commission exclude NCA competence until the Commission formally opens a procedure. ECR II-3435 of the claim that the Sodium Gluconate and Citric Acid cartels were but one infringement which the Commission had artfully split up into two so that it could exceed the 10 per cent fining cap: see Paragraphs 308-314. 115 JFE Engineering v Commission, supra n 62.
116 JFE Engineering v Commission, supra n 62, paras 370 -374.
117 BASF and UCB v Commission, supra n 10.
Article 25 (1) of Regulation 1/2003 -the Statute of Limitations-and extend duration by two years. An otherwise time-barred global cartel between the North American and EU producers of Choline Chloride that stopped in April 1994 was rolled into the same "continuous infringement" as a later agreement between the EU producers that was still operating shortly before the investigations.118 While the US and Canadian producers escaped fines, the EU players were held responsible for an infringement going back to the formation of the first, global, cartel with the North Americans in 1992. In its decision the Commission maintained that the global and European arrangements were in pursuit of "a single identical anticompetitive economic aim, namely the distortion of normal competitive conditions in the EEA for choline chloride. All of the concrete anti-competitive activities at the global level in respect of the EEA fit within that overall anticompetitive object, as do the activities at a European level."119 The reliance on assertion as much as hard evidence to demonstrate the "link" seems to have jarred with the court, as did the Commission's expansive interpretation of common objective. On appeal, the CFI found that an impact on competition constitutes "a consubstantial element of any conduct covered by Article 81".120 If a broad intention to increase prices were enough, different types of offending conduct in a particular sector would always have to be treated as a single infringement. The CFI concluded that to establish a single violation, (a) there had to be a common plan or economic aim; (b) the arrangements had to be "complementary", in the sense of interacting to realise the intended set of anti-competitive effects within the framework of a single objective.121 For the court, the European and global infringements were each continuous infringements on their own. To justify combining them into one, account had to be taken of all the circumstances, such as period of application, the content and methodology of the agreements and "correlatively", their objective.122
In the CFI's judgment, the Commission had failed to demonstrate sufficient interdependence between the global and the later EU cartel: the Europeans had not adhered to the global arrangement in order to divide up the EEA market, the control methods were dissimilar and they only began to allocate the European market amongst themselves after the global arrangement had failed. 125 Similar issues arose in the Commission decision in Gas Insulated Switchgear, supra n 84 which is currently before the CFI (although there the global ("GQ") and European ("EQ") arrangements were alleged to have been operated simultaneously). The Japanese producers claimed they were only involved in the worldwide cartel separate from the European cartel. Rejecting the argument, the Commission emphasised (a) the arrangements were contemporaneous; (b) the EQ agreement was expressly subordinated to the GQ agreement; (c) the members of the E-Group were parties to both Agreements; and (d) the content and mechanisms were interlinked: the Commission therefore "considers the measures agreed and taken at the European level as one coherent set of measures (sic) of the arrangements agreed at both the global and European level." (See Paragraph 278). In respect of several producers who allegedly left and returned to the cartel the Commission characterised their involvement as "repeated participation in the same infringement".
Durable as the single infringement concept has proved, it certainly was never intended as a slogan to substitute for robust legal or factual assessment. Nor, without more detailed analysis, is it determinative of the issue of whether a given course of conduct constitutes a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies. But if conceptually the distinction between a single and many conspiracies is clear enough, its empirical application is beset with difficulty. Overturning the decision on the facts, the Court basically confirmed the generic "totality of the evidence" approach of the previous case law.
Although the CFI has made it clear in BASF that meeting the interdependency requirement is not going to be a walk-over for the Commission, it would be helpful to have some workable guidance. 126 The assessment is an empirical one, but it should not be left to the Commission's discretion how to treat a given set of facts. An objective rule would free the Commission from suspicion that the approach it takes is driven by the desired outcome.
Given the single infringement's origins in the law of conspiracy, the US jurisprudence is a rich source to draw on to resolve the conundrum. The "single v multiple conspiracy" question arises in several contexts, including the due process clause in the Fifth Amendment.127 When one broad conspiracy is charged, the evidence as it comes out in court may show the existence of several conspiracies. Put very shortly, the inquiry on appeal in such cases is whether a variance between indictment and proof at trial has prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights.128 Casting the dragnet too wide can result in jury confusion and "transference" of the core players' guilt to minor actors.129 The Antitrust Division grand jury manual 130 instructs prosecutors that the allegations in the indictment must mirror what the evidence demonstrates: if the evidence supports one overall conspiracy with several sub-parts, it is appropriate to charge a single conspiracy. On the other hand, if more than one conspiracy is indicated, a defendant may properly be charged with more than one violation. There can be separate agreements with some parties common to all. There can be one overall agreement with changing membership. The evaluation of which way to go may be tricky since it is a mixed question of law and fact. Attorneys are warned that whichever path they choose, it will probably be challenged. 126 Seifert, supra n 2, 555.
127 The other main context in which the question arises is the double jeopardy clause, also embedded in the Fifth Amendment. In this context, the defendant attempts in a second prosecution to show that he has already been tried for the same conspiracy. For the courts, the task has been to find some means to analyse the facts that will lead to an objective, rather than wholly subjective determination of the scope of conspiracies. As the DoJ manual points out, "(i)t is the need to prove conspiracies by inference that makes determining the existence of single v multiple conspiracies so difficult."131 Unlike a civil contractual dispute where the parties are usually arguing over the interpretation of an agreement they both acknowledge they made, a conspiracy prosecution requires the government to prove the existence of an agreement which the parties deny making 132: the scope of the conspiracy has to a large extent to be deduced by inference from the conduct that can be proved.133
Although Sherman Act price fixing conspiracies have special features, US case law on the law of conspiracy in general may be helpful. To determine whether the evidence supported a single overall conspiracy, courts trying organised crime cases used to adopt a three-step enquiry: (a) First, the court examined whether there was a common goal among the conspirators; (b) next, it looked at the "nature (or structure) of the scheme"; and (c) it examined the extent of any overlap among participants.134
The reference to "structure" in the second prong derives from the distinction in classical conspiracy reasoning between the "chain" and the "wheel" or "hub and spoke" conspiracy. 135 In the former, where the participants are engaged at different levels in the same enterprise, knowledge of the existence of "remote links" may be inferred from the nature of the enterprise alone.136 Each link in the chain is obviously dependent on the others. In the "wheel" conspiracy, with the hub performing the same illegal acts with each of the spokes, it could well be that none of the latter even knows the others exist: the hub may be involved in separate conspiracies with each of the spokes.137 But structure is not in itself the determining factor: the essential point in both chain and wheel conspiracies is whether the actions of the conspirators were in furtherance of the same goal and they knew success of the whole depends on the success of each part. 138 And as the First Circuit pertinently observed in US v Portela,139 what the case law sometimes calls the calls the "nature of the scheme" really involves the analysis of interdependence. To determine if the evidence supports a finding of a single conspiracy (a single general agreement), courts should look for (1) a common goal; (2) interdependence among the participants, and (3) overlap among the participants.
US courts have thus more recently shifted away from a formal structural analysis in favour of a functional test. Cartels especially may not fit easily into one or the other traditional presentation of a conspiracy as a wheel or chain. 140 US antitrust cases have therefore tended to involve a "totality of the circumstances" test.141 Courts have developed a checklist of important factors: (1) number of alleged overt acts in common; (2) overlap in personnel (3) overlap in the time periods (4) similarity in the modus operandi (5) location of the actions (6) the sharing of a common objective and (7) the degree of interdependence required between the parts and the whole for the scheme to succeed.142 Once it is understood that the "nature of the scheme" refers to interdependence rather than formal structure, the difference between the "nature of the scheme" and the "totality of the circumstances" tests becomes a matter of semantics.
Whatever the test is called, it should involve a consistent, reasonable and objective approach. The list of relevant factors proposed by Commission officials, before BASF, is very close to the Antitrust Division'swithout the critical last element of "interdependence". Whatever its attractions in terms of flexibility, the broad approach is too vague. Two people applying it could depending on the weight they apply to the different factors come to opposite but equally reasonable conclusions.143 It needs a focus. The various elements of commonality should be considered not as a laundry-list to be ticked off but as sub-sets relevant to the determination of the main issue, namely the scope of the agreement.
Perhaps the most useful approach derives from the essential nature of conspiracy as an agreement. What exactly was it the parties agreed to?
The judgment of the Supreme Court in Braverman v US 144 provides a starting point of sorts: "The precise nature and extent of the conspiracy must be determined by reference to the agreement which embraces and defines its objects."145 According to the DoJ manual, "Braverman stands for the proposition that the scope of a conspiracy is determined by what the parties agreed to rather than by how many overt acts were involved or what the 140 The recent supplier-retailer cases fit readily into the "hub and spoke" analysis In JJB Sports v OFT in the CAT, the Tribunal held that it was not necessary to find whether there was one overall agreement or a series of interlocking agreements or concerted practice between the supplier Umbro and each of the retailers concerned: JJB, supra n.137, at paragraph 656. In Pioneer Hifi Equipment [1980] OJ L 60/21, the European Commission found that arrangements orchestrated by the Japanese producer to protect the high prices of MDF, the French exclusive distributor, from parallel imports from Germany and the UK involved two separate concerted practices between Pioneer, MDF and the respective UK and German exclusive distributors. 141 Grand Jury Manual, supra n 130, chapter seven, page 28. objects of the agreement might have been."146 Where the terms and scope of the conspiracy agreement are known, the number of agreements determines the number of conspiracies. But like the EC single infringement analysis in Anic, the Braverman approach on its own is circular. It presupposes there is one conspiracy.147 Of course the more that is known of the facts, the more material there is to inform the decision how many agreements there are. Cartels however thrive on secrecy, internally as well as towards the outside world. Not all members may be fully in the loop: "The key is the scope of the agreement. However this is not agreement in a subjective, contract sense of the word, for this would often result in extremely narrow conspiracies. If the general contours of a conspiracy are known, all those that interact with any other conspirators in such a way as to further the goals of the conspiracy are parties to the conspiracy and the sum of the interactions becomes the scope of the agreement."148 The DoJ's formulation encapsulates the critical issue neatly enough. Absent a formal document memorialising the agreement, it is the interactions of the parties themselves that define the terms of their agreement. While the scope of what ringleaders agreed may be easy enough to ascertain, the position of peripheral players can be problematic. The success of an overall scheme may depend on spawning subconspiracies, but minor players are sometimes just cat's paws of the core perpetrators. Inside a scheme that covers the whole of the US (or Europe), their role may well be limited to a narrow local arrangement. And the more complex the enterprise is, the more likely it is that there will be a "division of labour." Here the authorities are faced with a conundrum: the venture will only succeed by virtue of the combined efforts, but the more complex the enterprise, the more plausibly some of the participants could maintain they knew only about their own sub-scheme. On the one hand, participants should not be allowed too easily to assert their ignorance of the larger enterprise, but on the other, membership of the conspiracy should not be too broadly extended to minor players. To make them responsible for the broader scheme of which their actions are a part requires more than a purely structural analysis. Establishing the critical interdependence not only involves determining "whether the activities of one aspect of the scheme are necessary or advantageous to the success of another aspect of the scheme";149 each participant has to understand that this is the case. "Each defendant's state of mind, and not his mere participation in some branch of the venture is key."150 Knowing involvement is a vital component of interdependence. "Put another way, evidence of the individual participants understanding of the interdependence of the co-conspirators' activities is evidence -often the best evidence -of tacit agreement between the individual and his co-conspirators".
The DoJ guidance puts it like this in relation to cases where complicated fact patterns make the determination of single v multiple conspiracies tricky. To be able to hold a "fringe player" responsible for the whole venture, there is a two-step inquiry:
"Were the defendants generally aware of the objectives and composition of the larger conspiracy, and was the success of the various parts of the necessary to the success of the whole and vice versa?"151 146 Grand Jury Manual, supra n 130, chapter seven, page 25. 147 Note, "Single v multiple" criminal conspiracies", Minn. L. Rev, supra n 127, 309. Once the "outer boundaries" of the agreement are thus defined by reference to (a) knowledge and (b) interdependence "that becomes the conspiracy that must be charged; it may not be broken down into numerous lesser conspiracies because it embraced numerous lesser objectives."152
Knowledge does not however have to be perfect. Consolidated Packaging 153 provides an instructive counterweight to protestations of ignorance: "Consolidated...knew enough about the [overall] conspiracy to use it to serve its own purposes when needed...there was interested cooperation with a stake in the venture".154 "Known interdependence … makes it reasonable to speak of a common understanding."155
Combining a web of agreements into one overall conspiracy calls not only for a nexus of some kind between the components: the participants should all be stakeholders in the overall venture. To provide a fair and workable test in the EC context, the "interdependence" enquiry mandated by the CFI as the second leg in BASF 156 should itself be refined into a two-stage factual assessment of whether (a) the success of the various parts of the conspiracy is essential to success of the whole and vice versa, and (b) the participants, whatever their various roles, consciously contributed to and "had a stake" in the success of the whole enterprise. Once the outer boundaries of the scope of the agreement to which the parties have subscribed have been drawn by reference to this subjective and objective test, it is appropriate to define that as the infringement. With minor adaptations, the test can be used in any scenario. The key is giving the "totality of the circumstances" test a clear focus on answering the question: what was the scope of the enterprise in which all players had a stake? 152 The DOJ Manual explains, "Of course, the overall conspiracy may be broken down into numerous conspiracies so long as no defendant is charged more than once." If the government charges an overall conspiracy, and the evidence proves two, "variance in proof is harmless unless the defendant's substantial rights are adversely affected". 153 155 US v Glenn, supra n 150, 857-59.
